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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ects of introducing centrifugal incentives in an otherwise standard Down-
sian model of electoral competition. First, we demonstrate that a symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist when centrifugal incentives are induced by any kind of partial voter participation (such as
abstention due to indi¤erence, abstention due to alienation, etc.) and, then, we argue that: a) this
symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies, and it is hence convergent, only when centrifugal incentives
are su¢ ciently weak on both sides; b) when centrifugal incentives are strong on both sides (when, for
example, a lot of voters abstain when they are su¢ ciently indi¤erent between the two candidates)
players use mixed strategies - the stronger the centrifugal incentives, the larger the probability weight
that players assign to locations near the extremes; and c) when centrifugal incentives are strong on
one side only - say for example only on the right - the support of playersmixed strategies contain all
policies except from those that are su¢ ciently close to the left extreme.
JEL classication codes: D71, D72.
Keywords: Electoral Competition; Spatial Model; Downs; Mixed equilibria; Centrifugal incentives;
Abstention.
1 Introduction
In a standard Downsian model of electoral competition,1 a candidate located, for example, to the left of
her competitor always has incentives to approach her competitors location because all voters with ideal
The authors would like to thank two referees, an associate editor, Philippe De Donder and Juuso Välimäki as well as
participants of CRETE2013, EPSA General Conference 2014 and the MFS 2015 Conference for excellent comments and
suggestions.
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1We refer to Duggan (2012) and Osborne (1995) for nice surveys of the literature which originates to Hotellings (1929)
and Downss (1957) models of spatial competition.
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policies to her left will still vote for her. That is, a player in such a model unambiguously increases her
vote-share by approaching her competitor. In a sense, the standard Downsian model takes in account
existence only of centripetal incentives (understood here broadly as incentives that make one player want
to move closer to her opponent) and hence the popular convergence-to-the-center result is obtained.
But what if a share of voters located to the left (right) of the most leftist (rightist) candidate (or
party) feels alienated from the political process, and prefers to abstain or vote for extremist candidates
instead of the two main ones? What if a share of voters located in between candidates feels indi¤erent
and prefers to abstain from voting? In such cases it is straightforward that any motion of a candidate
towards her opponent is not unambiguously protable - such votersbehaviors generate centrifugal incen-
tives that mitigate the centripetal ones. To quote Cox (1990), from whom we borrow this terminology,
centrifugal incentives should be expected to "lead to the advocacy of, more or less, extreme positions".2
Hence, introduction of centrifugal incentives in an otherwise standard spatial model should be expected
to destabilize the convergence-to-the-center result.
In this paper we consider a generalized Downsian model that takes in account such centrifugal in-
centives. We assume that a participating voter3 always behaves in the standard manner: she votes for
the candidate whose policy proposal is closer to her ideal policy. But the share of participating voters
of a certain preference type (that is, of voters that have the same policy preferences), is allowed to be
essentially any function of candidatespolicy proposals - which may di¤erent, of course, for every distinct
voters type. That is, our model takes in account all kinds of cases of partial voter participation (for
example, abstention due to indi¤erence,4 abstention due to alienation,5 etc.) and this makes us believe
that its analysis is relevant and worthwhile.
We notice that this general formulation is equivalent to having that the share of participating voters to
the left (right) of the most leftist (rightist) candidate and the share of participating voters in between the
platform of the most leftist (rightist) candidate and the ideal policy of the indi¤erent voter, are functions
2For a detailed exposition of possible reasons behind centrifugal incentives in electoral competition one is referred to
Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005). We briey discuss some of them in the end of this section.
3A participating voter is someone who votes for one of the two main competing candidates. On the contrary a non-
participating voter is a voter that does not vote for one of these two candidates: such voters could be abstaining or they
could be voting for other non-instrumental candidates. In the Appendix we provide a specic application in which non-
participating voters are assumed to vote for extremist/niche parties with xed policy positions (non-instrumental).
4For example, Matakos et al. (2015b) introduce indi¤erence-based abstention to a unidimensional model of electoral
competition in order to study the e¤ect of electoral rule disproportionality on turnout (one is referred to Matakos et al.,
2015a, for a more comprehensive presentation of the formal setup) and show that it generates centrifugal incentives.
5Downs (1957) shows that alienation-based abstention reinforces centrifugal incentives (conditional on the distribution of
votersideal policies not being very polarized).
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of the policy platforms of the two candidates. Indeed, candidateslocation choices (when they are interior
and they do not coincide) divide the space in four regions6 - two peripheral regions and two central ones
- and hence, for a given distribution of ideal policies, we essentially have four (possibly distinct) functions
that determine the share of voters that participate in the election - one function for each region.
The rst contribution of the paper is to prove that for this general class of centrifugal incentives
(when, centrifugal incentives arise due to partial voter participation), the game admits a symmetric Nash
equilibrium for every possible distribution of voters ideal policies. Since this generalized model is a
discontinuous one (like the standard Downsian one), in order to establish this general existence result we
apply a theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). We then try to shed some light on the nature of the
symmetric equilibria that we proved to exist by focusing on the simplest class of centrifugal incentives.
That is, by focusing on the simplest kind of functions that could be used to determine the share of
participating voters in each region - the class of constant functions - and on a uniform distribution of
votersideal policies. Notice that the use of constant and generally di¤erent alienation functions introduces
in our model a second ingredient besides centrifugal incentives: di¤erential party loyalty. Namely, when
the share of voters located to the left of the most leftist candidate who feel alienated from the political
process di¤ers from the share of voters located to the right of the most rightist candidate who feel
alienated from the political process, there is generally a discontinuity of a partys payo¤ function when
its rival is located at the center. This means that being identied as the leftist (or the rightist) party, by
di¤erentiating ones policy proposals even innitesimally from the rival partys policy proposals, induces
an upward (downward) jump in a partys vote share.
In general three types of congurations may be encountered.
The rst one describes the case where centripetal incentives dominate centrifugal incentives on both
sides of the strategy space (large shares of participating voters in the peripheral regions compared to the
central ones). In that case, the Downsian logic of minimal di¤erentiation, where the two players converge
towards a point which may be more or less close to the center, depending on the degree of asymmetry
between the centrifugal incentives, applies. For the uniform distribution, the point of convergence will
belong to the interval

1
3 ;
2
3

. This is because even if centripetal incentives are dominant on both sides
they can still be asymmetric; asymmetry of these forces crucially a¤ects the point of convergence. If, for
6The rst region contains all locations to the left of the most leftist platform, the second region contains all locations
from the most leftist platform to the ideal policy of the indi¤erent voter (i.e. the voter whose ideal policy is equidistant from
the two platforms), the third region contains all locations in between the ideal policy of the indi¤erent voter and the most
rightist platform and the fourth region all locations to the right of the most rightist platform.
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example, players face stronger centrifugal incentives from the right (the share of participating voters of
the left peripheral region is larger than that of the right one), they converge to a point which belongs
on the left half of the strategy space. That is, on the side of the policy space where centrifugal incentives
are weaker - not the other way round. This is intuitively the consequence of the di¤erential party loyalty
e¤ect. In the previous example, when the rival party located at the center, a party would unambiguously
increase its vote-share by choosing a policy proposal just to the left of its rivals, allowing to be identied
itself as the leftist party.7 Most importantly we show that candidateschoices in this case depend only on
the shares of participating voters in the peripheral regions.
The second conguration describes the case where centrifugal incentives dominate centripetal incen-
tives on both sides of the strategy space (small shares of participating voters in the peripheral regions
compared to the central ones). This case raises some interesting coordination problems if the players are
totally opportunistic, that is, without real attachment to the left or the right. If a coordination mechanism
is absent, there is a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. Not surprisingly, the expected degree of
di¤erentiation in this equilibrium is increasing in the degree of the centrifugal incentives. In the case
in which centrifugal incentives on both sides are of equal magnitude, there is a smooth transition from
these mixed equilibria to the pure strategy equilibrium of the strong centripetal incentives case. When
centrifugal incentives are very large, players use a dispersed mixed strategy which assigns large probability
weights to locations at the extreme of the strategy space (U-shaped density function). As the magnitude
of centrifugal incentives declines, but as long as they dominate centripetal ones, the mixed strategy that
players use assigns an increasing probability weight to central locations (inverse U-shaped density). In
this case, candidatesexpected location depends only on the shares of participating voters in the central
regions.
The third conguration describes a situation where centripetal incentives are dominant on one side
and centrifugal incentives are dominant on the other side.8 Assume, for example, that centripetal forces
dominate on the left and centrifugal forces dominate on the right (large share of participating voters on
the left and small share of participating voters on the right). This conguration is non-trivial as there
is no equilibrium in pure strategies: the best reply dynamics are chaotic. We characterize a symmetric
equilibrium in mixed strategies which has a number of interesting features. The common mixed strategy
that players use in this equilibrium is such that a) the support of this mixed strategy does not contain
7Remember that, in this example, centripetal incentives (and, hence, party loyalty) are stronger on the left.
8There is some similarity between this conguration and the unidirectional Hotelling-Downs s model analyzed in Cancian,
Bergström and Bills (1995), Gabszewicz, Laussel and Le Breton (2008) and Xefteris (2013).
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extreme leftist locations, b) the support of this mixed strategy contains extreme rightist locations, c) the
density of the underlying distribution of this mixed strategy is decreasing and d) candidates expected
location depends on the shares of participating voters in both central and peripheral regions.
Of course, we are not the rst ones to consider unidimensional models of electoral competition with
both centripetal and centrifugal incentives. The post-Downsian literature contains several models along
these lines. In particular, in the framework of electoral competition centrifugal incentives have been
introduced through a variety of di¤erent channels. For instance in a model with ideological candidates
and uncertainty on the location of the median voter (Roemer, 2001), the leftist candidate will balance
between moving left to please (if elected) the voter on behalf of whom he is acting and moving towards
the centre to increase the probability of winning the election. Moreover, Adams, Merrill and Grofman
(2005)9 "show that three factors, each linked to voter choice, can generate strong centrifugal pressures
on the positioning of parties: (1) the existence of non-policy considerations in voter decision making -
most notably party loyalty; (2) the capacity of voters to discount the claims of candidates concerning
the policy changes they could achieve; and (3) an unwillingness of citizens to participate in the political
process when they nd that none of the existing parties or candidates are su¢ ciently attractive".10 While
the authors recognize that such games generally fail to admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, they
do not investigate the corresponding class of patterns to which they refer as unstable.11 Instead, they
determine conditions under which the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In
this paper we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies for a simple class of centrifugal
incentives, which allows us, though, to study in detail the e¤ect of a wide range of asymmetries among
these incentives on playersequilibrium behavior.
In what follows we describe the model (section 2), we present some general results, mainly regard-
ing equilibrium existence (section 3), we conduct a detailed equilibrium analysis for the case in which
centrifugal incentives are modelled by a quadruple of constant functions and the voters ideal policies
are uniformly distributed on the policy space (section 4) and, nally, we conclude (section 5). In the
Appendix we provide some results about pure strategy equilibria for nonuniform distributions of voters
9See also Merrill and Adams (2002) who analyze factors that a¤ect candidates position-taking incentives in multi-
candidate and multi-party elections. For a multivariate vote model that includes a Left-Right policy component, a party
identication component and an unmeasured term that renders the vote choice probabilistic, they present theoretical and
computer simulation results that quantify candidatesincentives to shift their policies away from the center in the direction
of their partisan constituenciesmean policy preferences. Centrifugal incentives are found to increase with (1) the salience
of policies and party identication, (2) the size of the candidate eld, (3) the size of a candidates partisan constituency and
(4) more extreme constituency policy preferences. Thus, ceteris paribus, candidates who represent large constituencies are
motivated to present more extreme policies than are candidates who represent small ones.
10Page 2.
11Page 44.
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ideal policies and also some microfoundations of the constant functions extensively analyzed in the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a model in which two players (candidates/parties), 1 and 2, simultaneously locate on the
interval [0; 1]. We denote by x (y) the location choice of player 1 (2). The ideal policies of a unit mass
of voters are distributed on [0; 1] according to a strictly increasing and absolutely continuous distribution
function, F : [0; 1]! [0; 1]. Given a prole (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 ; the payo¤s of the two players are assumed to
be as follows
1(x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
R x+y
2
0 (; x; y)f()d if x < y
1
2
R 1
0 (; x; y)f()d if x = yR 1
x+y
2
(; x; y)f()d if x > y
and the payo¤ of candidate 2 is given by:
2(x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
R x+y
2
0 (; x; y)f()d if y < x
1
2
R 1
0 (; x; y)f()d if y = xR 1
x+y
2
(; x; y)f()d if y > x
where  is integrable with respect to  on [0; 1], takes non-negative values at most as large as one
and is symmetric - that is, (; x; y) = (; y; x) for every (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2. The postulate behind these
payo¤ functions is that, given a menu of two platforms x and y, a participating voter always votes for the
candidate who proposes the policy nearer to her ideal policy, but only a fraction, (; x; y), of voters with
ideal policy  actually participate in the election. Since (; x; y) is allowed to vary in all its arguments
the above formulation captures essentially all kinds of centrifugal incentives that may arise due to partial
voter participation. In studies which consider abstention due to indi¤erence (see, for example, Hortala-
Vallve and Esteve-Volart 2011 and Matakos et al. 2015b), (; x; y) is zero (one) for every  su¢ ciently
close to (far from) x+y2 while in studies which consider abstention due to alienation (see, for example,
Downs 1957), (; x; y) is zero (one) for every  su¢ ciently far from (close to) candidatesplatforms.
For a given distribution F , we can dene (x; y) =
Rminfx;yg
0 (;x;y)f()d
F (minfx;yg) for minfx; yg > 0 and
6
(x; y) =  2 [0; 1] otherwise; (x; y) =
R 1
maxfx;yg (;x;y)f()d
1 F (maxfx;yg) for maxfx; yg < 1 and (x; y) =  2 [0; 1]
otherwise; (x; y) =
R x+y
2
minfx;yg (;x;y)f()d
F (x+y
2
) F (minfx;yg) for x 6= y and (x; y) =  2 [0; 1] otherwise; and (x; y) =Rmaxfx;yg
x+y
2
(;x;y)f()d
F (maxfx;yg) F (x+y
2
)
for x 6= y and (x; y) =  2 [0; 1] otherwise.12 Notice that since  is integrable with
respect to , all the above functions are guaranteed to be continuous everywhere, except possibly at their
problematic points.
Hence we can re-write the playerspayo¤ functions as:
1(x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
(x; y)F (x) + (x; y)(F (x+y2 )  F (x)) if x < y
1
2 [(x; y)(1  F (x)) + (x; y)F (x)] if x = y
(x; y)(1  F (x)) + (x; y)(F (x)  F (x+y2 )) if x > y
and
2(x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
(x; y)(1  F (y)) + (x; y)(F (y)  F (x+y2 )) if x < y
1
2 [(x; y)(1  F (x)) + (x; y)F (x)] if x = y
(x; y)F (y) + (x; y)(F (x+y2 )  F (y)) if x > y
:
Given a) that this model incorporates a wide class of diverse cases of centrifugal incentives and b)
that this second pair of payo¤ functions o¤ers an arguably more direct way of classifying these cases into
subgroups (based on how voters behave on average in each of the four distinct regions), we stick with the
latter formulation throughout our analysis.
Before we proceed though we draw attention to some features of the game that need to be emphasized.
First, notice that for a generic quadruplet (; ; ; ), the game is not zero-sum. In spite of the fact that
the game is competitive, it also contains coordination dimensions. Second, the game is symmetric in the
sense that 1(x; y) = 2(y; x) for all (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2. Third, the game is discontinuous: the function is
discontinuous on the diagonal of the square. Symmetric discontinuous games raise intricate di¢ culties
as they do not necessarily admit equilibria in mixed strategies and, even if they do, they do not always
admit a symmetric equilibrium (see Fey 2012 and Xefteris 2015). In this paper, we prove existence of a
symmetric equilibrium for the general case using the Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) conditions and then we
12Setting the functions equal to some arbitrary constant at their problematic points is only made for completeness and has
no e¤ect on formal analysis.
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construct explicitly a symmetric equilibrium for the case in which (; ; ; ) is a quadruplet of constant
functions and F is uniform.
3 General Remarks
The model that we consider introduces, principally, centrifugal forces and, secondarily, di¤erential party
loyalty. On one hand, when the centrifugal (centripetal) incentives are dominant on the left (right), the
vote-share of a party decreases (increases) when a party approaches her opponent from the left (right). On
the other hand, di¤erential party loyalty results generally in a discontinuity of the partys payo¤ function
when the partys policy proposition becomes, at the center, identical to its rivals one. As already argued,
this reects the possibly di¤erent magnitudes of the centrifugal incentives on the left of the leftist party
and on the right of the rightist one.
For the sake of illustration, consider that (x; y) = ; (x; y) = ; (x; y) =  > 0 and (x; y) =  > 0
for every (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2; and dene ^ = = and ^ = =. Then, if the second player locates to the right
of the rst player (x < y), we have:
@2
@y
(x; y) = [(1  ^)f(y)  1
2
f(
x+ y
2
)]
and therefore:
@2
@y
(x; y) < 0 if and only if (1  ^)f(y)  1
2
f(
x+ y
2
) < 0:
If ^ is close to one, not surprisingly, the inequality is likely to hold true as the right player does not
lose too much voters on its right by moving to the left. On the contrary, when ^ = 0, the condition writes
f(y) < 12f(
x+y
2 ). If the density does not decrease too fast, it will not be satised. For instance, when F is
uniform, it does not hold true. Precisely, when F is uniform, the general inequality holds true if and only
if ^ > 12 . For this reason when we refer to strong centrifugal (centripetal) incentives we actually mean
small (large) values of ^ and ^.
The conventional Hotelling-Downs model corresponds to ^ = ^ = 1 and, hence, it pays attention
exclusively to centripetal forces, that is, incentives pushing each player to move in the direction of its
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opponent. Centrifugal incentives are absent. On the contrary, our model takes into account a variety of
centrifugal forces. To understand the nature of these implications, we look at the payo¤ function of the
rst player when the distribution of voters is uniform and  = .
Let ^; ^ > 12 . In such a case the centripetal incentives are strong and, thus, the payo¤ function 1
is increasing on [0; y), decreasing on (y; 1] and displays a discontinuity at y if and only if y 6= + . The
discontinuity is as depicted in gure 1a if y > + or as depicted in gure 1b if y <

+ .
Insert Figure 1 here
Now, let ^; ^ < 12 . In such a case, the centrifugal incentives are strong and, thus, the payo¤ function
1 is decreasing on [0; y), increasing on (y; 1] and displays a discontinuity at y if and only if y 6= + .
Since 1(0; y) = 
y
2 ; 1(1; y) = 
1 y
2 = 
1 y
2 and 1(y; y) = 
^y+^(1 y)
2 , the best response of player 1
to y is zero if y > 12 and one if y <
1
2 . Indeed, since ^ <
1
2 , we cannot have both
y
2 <
^y+^(1 y)
2 and
1 y
2 <
^y+^(1 y)
2 . But the value at one extreme may be smaller than the value at the discontinuity point.
The graph of 1 is as depicted in gure 1c if y >

+ or as depicted in gure 1d if y <

+ .
Finally, let ^ > 12 > ^: In such case, the centrifugal incentives are dominant on the right and the
centripetal incentives are dominant on the left and, thus, the payo¤ function 1 is increasing on [0; y),
increasing on (y; 1] and displays a discontinuity at y if and only if y 6= + . The graph of 1 is as depicted
in gure 1e if y > + or as depicted in gure 1f if y <

+ .
Equilibrium existence in such discontinuous games is not straightforward. Our rst task will be to
demonstrate that our game satises the Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) conditions which guarantee the exis-
tence of a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies13 in certain symmetric games with discontinuities.
Proposition 1 The game admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for every admis-
sible quadruplet of functions (; ; ; ) and every absolutely continuous F .
13For a symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium to be meaningful in a political competition setting, we must have in mind
situations when there is no cost for an actor to be ultimately on the left or on the right of any other actor. There should
be no constraints on positioning and leapfrogging should not be costly. This may happen if the parties are not too much
ideological (like Aragonès and Palfrey, 2002, and Aragonès and Xefteris, 2013, who characterize mixed equilibria of the
Downsian model with a favored candidate under perfect and imperfect information) or within a party if the competition
describes primaries among candidates.
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Proof. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) show that if a) the pure strategy space for each player is
represented by a closed interval, b) the payo¤ functions are continuous except on a set of measure zero,
c) the playerscumulative payo¤ function is upper semi-continuous, d) the range of the payo¤ function of
each player is bounded and e) the payo¤ function of each player is weakly lower semi-continuous for any
given strategy of the other player, then the game admits an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Therefore,
to prove that our game admits a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies the only thing that we have to do
is to show that all these ve conditions are met.
a) The pure strategy space for each player is [0; 1]; a closed interval.
b) 1(x; y) and 2(x; y) are continuous except for the main diagonal, that is, except for x = y. This
line obviously represents a measure zero of all the possible pure strategy proles which are given by [0; 1]2.
c) 1(x; y)+2(x; y) = (x; y)F (minfx; yg)+(x; y)[F (x+y2 ) F (minfx; yg)]+(x; y)[F (maxfx; yg 
F (x+y2 ))] + (x; y)(1 F (maxfx; yg)) is a continuous function since it is a sum of continuous functions.14
That is, it is upper semi-continuous as well.
d) 0  1(x; y)  1 and 0  2(x; y)  1 for any (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2: That is, the playerspayo¤s are
bounded.
e) 1(x; y) is weakly lower semi-continuous in x if 8x 2 [0; 1]; 9 2 [0; 1] such that for y = x;
 lim inf
x! y
1(x; y) + (1  ) lim inf
x!+y
1(x; y)  1(x; y):
If y 2 (0; 1) then observe that for y = x; 1(x; y) = (y;y)F (y)+(y;y)(1 F (y))2 ; lim infx! y 1(x; y) =
(y; y)F (y) and lim infx!+y 1(x; y) = (y; y)(1   F (y)): It is evident that for  = 12 the required weak
inequality becomes an equality for any quadruplet of continuous functions (; ; ; ) and any absolutely
continuous F and, thus, always holds. If y 2 f0; 1g (say for example that y = 0) then for y = x; 1(x; y) =
(0;0)
2 and lim infx!+y 1(x; y) = (0; 0): In this case the denition of weak lower semi-continuity requires
that lim infx!+y 1(x; y)  1(x; y) which holds for any any quadruplet of continuous functions (; ; ; )
14The function (x; y)F (minfx; yg) is continuous everywhere because when minfx; yg > 0 both (x; y) and F (minfx; yg)
are continuous and when minfx; yg = 0 we have (x; y)F (minfx; yg) = 0 and limminfx;yg!0 (x; y)F (minfx; yg) = 0.
Equivalently, one can show that (x; y)(1 F (maxfx; yg)), (x; y)[F (x+y
2
) F (minfx; yg)] and (x; y)[F (maxfx; yg F (x+y
2
))]
are continuous everywhere.
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and any absolutely continuous F: That is, 1(x; y) (and equivalently 2(x; y)) is weakly lower semi-
continuous and the game admits a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Finally, Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) prove (Lemma 7) that if a game that satises the above conditions
is moreover symmetric and discontinuities are restricted on the main diagonal,15 then this game should
admit a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Since the game that we study is symmetric, it
follows that it should admit a symmetric equilibrium. 
To have a better understanding about how introduction of centrifugal incentives a¤ects the nature of
equilibria in the Downsian model, we explicitly analyze in the next section symmetric equilibria for the
case in which (; ; ; ) is a quadruplet of constant functions and F is uniform.
4 Equilibria
In this section, we study symmetric Nash equilibria of the game for all quadruplets (; ; ; ) of admissible
strictly positive constant functions when F is a uniform distribution on [0; 1]. When these functions are
constant we can dene ^ = = and ^ = =. For easier presentation of the results and without loss of
generality, we assume throughout this section that ^  ^. We distinguish three broad cases according
to the nature of the existing forces: centripetal (^ > 12 and ^  12), mixed (^ > 12 > ^) and centrifugal
(^  12 and ^ < 12) ones.16
Before we go to a detailed study of each case we make an observation that will prove helpful in our
equilibrium exercise.
Remark 1 The discontinuity in own strategies of 1(x; y) at y 6= + and of 2(x; y) at x 6= + implies,
whenever  +  > 0, that the two players strategies cannot have an atom at the same point x 6= +
because each player would obtain a strictly larger payo¤ by choosing a platform just to the right or to the
15See the discussion in page 7 of their paper.
16For the sake of completeness we present here the equilibria of the limit case where the centrifugal and centripetal incentives
balance exactly, i.e. ^ = ^ = 1
2
: Clearly this case represents a measure zero of all possible combinations of parameters values.
If ^ = ^ = 1
2
, then it is easy to check that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria. Precisely, up to interchangeability,
(x; y) with x  y is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if x  1
2
and y  1
2
. The Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked:
the smaller the x and the larger the y, the larger are the payo¤s of both players.
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left of such an x: This rules out symmetric pure strategy equilibria other than x = y = + as well as
symmetric atomic mixed strategy equilibria.
Case 1 - Centripetal incentives (^ > 12 and ^  12).
This case corresponds to a scenario in which both players increase their payo¤s by approaching one
another.
Proposition 2 If ^ > 12 and ^  12 then the pure strategy prole ( + ; + ) is the unique pure
strategy equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Consider that the rst player locates strictly to the left of the second player; x < y: Then:
@1
@x (x; y) = (^  12) > 0.
That is, the rst player has incentives to further approach the second player and hence there is no
equilibrium in pure strategies such that the two players locate at distinct locations.
Now consider that both players locate at the same location; x = y = x: In this case we have:
1(x; x) = 2(x; x) =
1
2((1  x) + x):
If x > + then the rst player, by deviating to ex = x  ", gets a payo¤ of:
1(ex; x) = [^(x  ") + (2x "2   (x  "))] = (12"+ ^x  ^")! x for "! 0:
Observe that x > + =) x > (1  x) =) x > 12((1  x) + x) and hence one may always nd
" > 0 small enough for such a deviation to be protable. One can use a symmetric argument and show
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that when both players locate at x < + , the rst player is better o¤ by deviating marginally to the
right. Therefore, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies such that x = y 6= + .
If x = + one can show using the same formal arguments as before that any deviation to the left or
to the right of + benets none of both players. That is, (

+ ;

+ ) is the unique equilibrium of the
game in pure strategies for these parameter values. 
For this case, the unique pure strategy equilibrium that we identied is a quite robust prediction.
Both due to the fact that the equilibrium is the unique in pure strategies and because it is symmetric -
coordination issues should not interfere with the result. Note that while the game is competitive, it need
not be strictly competitive17 (Aumann 1961; Friedman 1983). To see this, consider that  =  = 1 and
observe that 1(0; 1) = 2(0; 1) = 12 while 1(

+ ;

+ ) = 2(

+ ;

+ ) =

+ <
1
2 as + > 
2 +2 
2 when 0 < ;  < 1. This means that in such cases we have a prisoners dilemma-like situation: a
Nash equilibrium which is Pareto dominated. While not necessarily strictly competitive, the game still
exhibits some competitive features and we conjecture that even in these cases there is no equilibrium in
mixed strategies.
As far as comparative statics of this equilibrium are concerned we observe that the playerscommon
location ( + ) is strictly decreasing (increasing) in  () but it is bounded from below by
1
3 . That is, in
our two-player non-cooperative scenario, when centripetal forces are strong from both sides but somehow
stronger from the left side, players converge to a moderate-left location ( + 2 (13 ; 12 ]) as the peripheral
votersloyalty to the leftist party is greater. Finally, we note that in this case, candidateslocation choices
depend only on the values of  and  and not on the exact votersbehavior in the central regions.
Case 2 - Mixed incentives (^ > 12 > ^).
In this case best response dynamics are non-trivial: if the rst player is located to the left of the
second one, then the rst one has incentives to approach the second player while the second player has
17A game is strictly competitive if all possible outcomes are Pareto-optimal.
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incentives to move away from her opponent. These diverse incentives that players face rule out existence
of Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Proposition 3 If ^ > 12 > ^ then a) there is no pure strategy equilibrium and b) there exists a unique
continuously di¤erentiable atomless equilibrium (G;G) with a convex support. When 2+ 2 6=  + :
G(x ) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(2 )
(2+2  ) +
(2 )
(2+2  )(
(x 1)+x
 )
+
2(+)
 1 if x 2
2666664
+
0@  2 2++2(+) ( 2+)
2 
1A 
2(+)
 2 2++
+ ; 1
3777775
0 if x 2
26666640;
+
0@  2 2++2(+) ( 2+)
2 
1A 
2(+)
 2 2++
+
3777775
and when 2+ 2 =  + :
G(x ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
++(2 )[ln ln((x 1)+x)]
+ if x 2
"
+e
+
2 
+ ; 1
#
0 if x 2
"
0; +e
+
2 
+
#
Proof. Consider that the rst player locates strictly to the right of the second player; x < y: Then:
@1
@x (x; y) = (^  12) > 0 and @2@y (x; y) = (^   12) > 0.
That is, the rst player has incentives to approach the location of the second player and hence there
is no pure strategy equilibrium in which players choose distinct locations.
Now consider that both players locate at the same interior point; x = y = x 2 (0; 1): In this case we
have:
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1(x; x) = 2(x; x) =
1
2((1  x) + x):
As made clear by Remark 1, for (x; x) to be an equilibrium it must be the case that x = + . At
this point it holds that (1   x) = x. That is, for every positive  and  this point is strictly smaller
than one and since limy!x+ 2(x; y) = (1  x) and @2@y (x; y) > 0 for every y > x, the second player has
incentives to deviate to the right - no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may exist.
If there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium (G;G) in mixed strategies such that G is atomless and
continuously di¤erentiable with convex support [g; g]  [0; 1] (G(g) = 0 and G(g) = 1), it must be the
case that the rst player is indi¤erent among all locations in [g; g], that is:
1(x;G) =
xR
g
[(x  x+y2 ) + (1  x)]dG(y) +
gR
x
[(x+y2   x) + x]dG(y) =  for x 2 [g; g]
and that she is never better o¤ by locating out of [g; g], that is, 1(x;G)   for x =2 [g; g]. If there
is such a G then @1@x (x;G) = 0 for x 2 [g; g] which is equivalent (since G is assumed to be continuously
di¤erentiable) to the di¤erential equation:
1
2(2  )(1 G(x))  12(2   )G(x) + (1  x)G0(x)  xG0(x) = 0 for x 2 [g; g]:
which has a unique solution up to a constant of integration. We notice that g must be equal to one.
This is so because when x > y we have that @1@x (x; y) = (
1
2   ^) > 0. So if g < 1, then the rst
player has incentives to locate to the right of g because @1@x (x;G) = 
gR
g
(12   ^)dG(y) = (12   ^) > 0 for
any x > g. That is, g is not a best response to G and, thus, a symmetric continuously di¤erentiable
equilibrium (G;G) with g < 1 is not possible. From this observation we get that G(1) = 1. Using this
information, we solve the above di¤erential equation and we get the expression presented in the statement
of the proposition.
Next we set G(g) = 0 and we nd:
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g =
 +
 

  2 2++
2(+) ( 2+)
2 
!  2(+) 2 2++
+ 
>

+ 
> 0 when 2+ 2 6=  +  and
g =
 + e
+
2 
+ 
>

+ 
> 0 when 2+ 2 =  + :
We know that when x < y we have that @1@x (x; y) = (^   12) > 0: So if g > 0 then @1@x (x;G) =

1R
g
(^  12)dG(y) = (^  12) > 0 for any x < g. That is, if the second player plays G then the rst player
strictly prefers g to any x < g and is indi¤erent among any of the locations in [g; 1]; playing G is a best
response of the rst player to the second player playing G. This concludes the argument. 
It is important to note that the density is decreasing and therefore that the CDF is concave. Examples
of such mixed strategies are provided on gure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here
We have assumed ^ > 12 > ^, that is, strong centripetal incentives from the left and strong centrifugal
incentives from the right. As we observe, the support of G excludes locations at the extreme left but
contains locations at the extreme right; the support of G suggests that players will never locate at the
extreme on whose side incentives are centripetal. Moreover, since both g and one belong to the support
of G it should hold that 1(g;G) = 2(1; G) and hence that g+
R 1
g (
y+g
2   g)dG(y) =
R 1
g 
1 y
2 dG(y),R 1
0 ydG(y) =
 2g+g
+ . That is, the expected location of each player in this equilibrium depends on how
voters behave both in central and in peripheral regions.
Case 3 - Centrifugal incentives (^  12 and ^ < 12).
This case obviously corresponds to the opposite scenario of the rst case. Here each player has
incentives to move away from the other player when they nd themselves located at distinct points.
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Proposition 4 If ^  12 and ^ < 12 , then there exists a unique piecewise continuously di¤erentiable
atomless equilibrium (G;G) with a convex support. It is given by:
G(x) =
8<:
(2 )
(2+2  )   (2 )(2+2  )((1 x) x )
+
2(+)
 1 if x 2 [0; + )
(2 )
(2+2  ) +
(2 )
(2+2  )(
(x 1)+x
 )
+
2(+)
 1 if x 2 [ + ; 1]
Proof. The derivation of the general form of G(x) is performed as before. The big di¤erence here is
that, unlike the ^ > 12 > ^ case, the support [g; g]  [0; 1] of a symmetric atomless equilibrium in this
case should be such that [g; g] = [0; 1]: This is so because, if g < 1(one can o¤er an equivalent argument
to exclude the g > 0 case), then @1@x (x;G) = 
gR
g
(12   ^)dG(y) = (12   ^) > 0 for any x > g. That is,
playing g is not a best response of the rst player to the second player playing such a mixed strategy.
Therefore, if a symmetric atomless equilibrium with convex support exists, it should satisfy [g; g] = [0; 1],
G(0) = 0 and G(1) = 1: Since in this case ^ + ^ 6= 1, the general form of G(x) on any interval where G
is continuously di¤erentiable is:
G(x) =
(2  )
(2+ 2      ) + C(j(1  x)  xj)
+
2(+)
 1
:
If we dene:
GA(x) =
(2  )
(2+ 2      )  
(2  )
(2+ 2      )(
(1  x)  x

)
+
2(+)
 1
and
GB(x) =
(2  )
(2+ 2      ) +
(2   )
(2+ 2      )(
(x  1) + x

)
+
2(+)
 1
we observe that GA(x) = GB(x) if and only if x =

+ : Moreover we have that GA(0) = 0;
@GA
@x > 0
for any x 2 [0; + ]; @GB@x > 0 for any x 2 [ + ; 1] and G(1) = 1: In other words G, as dened in
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the statement of this proposition, is a piecewise continuously di¤erentiable strictly increasing cumulative
distribution function with full support in [0; 1]:
So if the rst player uses this strategy then 2(G; y) =  for any y 2 [0; 1] - G is a best response of
the second player to the rst player playing G.
Now assume that there exists another piecewise continuously di¤erentiable G^ 6= G which denes
another atomless symmetric equilibrium. Then, the rst piece of G^ should also be identical to GA
because, otherwise, G^ would not be equal to zero for x = 0 and strictly positive for every x > 0; and,
hence, G^ would either have an atom at zero (and, therefore, it would not dene an atomless equilibrium)
or its support would not coincide with [0; 1] (this contradicts the arguments in the beginning of this
proof). Moreover, G^ may not have a piece distinct to GA which starts before

+ . If this were true G^
would have a discontinuity at the point at which the new piece starts; and this would contradict the fact
that it denes an atomless equilibrium. This is so because:
(2  )
(2+ 2      ) + C
0(j(1  x)  xj)
+
2(+)
 1 6= (2  )
(2+ 2      ) + C
00(j(1  x)  xj)
+
2(+)
 1
;
for every x < + when C
0 6= C 00.
Equivalently, we can show that G^may not have a piece distinct to GB which ends after

+ . Therefore,
G must be the unique piecewise continuously di¤erentiable function that denes a symmetric atomless
equilibrium. 
To discuss some of the qualitative features of this equilibrium we focus on the case in which  =  = 1.
That is, in the case in which all voters located in the central regions vote for one of the two players.
Di¤erent shapes of the density may appear, as illustrated on gure 3.
Insert Figure 3 here
If + is less than 12 , the probability mass will be more on the extremes with a density rst decreasing
and then increasing (gures 3a and 3b). If +  = 12 , then G is uniform (gure 3c). Finally, if +  is
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larger than 12 , then the probability mass is more concentrated in the center with a density rst increasing
and then decreasing (gure 3d).
Remark 2 There is a smooth transition from the pure symmetric Nash equilibria of Proposition 2 to the
mixed ones of Proposition 4. For the sake of illustration take  =  and  =  = 1. When  2 (0; 14 ], the
mass of 12 on both sides of the center of the policy space is located around the two extremes, and tends to
1
20 +
1
21
18 when  tends to 0. That is, when (; ) converges to (0; 0) a symmetric mixed equilibrium of
the game converges to the diagonal prole of mixed strategies (G;G) where G = 120 +
1
21. In contrast,
when  2 (14 ; 12 ], the mass of 12 on both sides of 12 is located around 12 and tends to  12when  tends to
1
2 .
Since both zero and one belong to the support of G it should hold that 1(0; G) = 2(1; G) and hence
that
R 1
0 
y
2dG(y) =
R 1
0 
1 y
2 dG(y) ,
R 1
0 ydG(y) =

+ . That is, the expected location of each player in
this equilibrium depends only on how voters in the central regions behave.
To sum up we have that when centrifugal forces are very weak from both sides, expected equilibrium
location depends only on how voters in the peripheral regions behave; when centrifugal forces are strong
from on side and weak from the other, then expected equilibrium location is sensitive on how voters in
both kinds of regions behave, and, nally, when centrifugal forces are strong on both sides, expected
equilibrium location depends only on how voters in central regions behave.
When centrifugal incentives dominate on both sides there also exist two asymmetric pure strategy
equilibria and many asymmetric equilibria in mixed strategies.
Proposition 5 If ^; ^ < 12 then the pure strategy proles (0; 1) and (1; 0) are the unique pure strategy
equilibria of the game.
Proof. Consider that the rst player locates strictly to the left of the second player; x < y: Then:
@1
@x (x; y) = (^  12) < 0 and @2@y (x; y) = (12   ^) > 0.
18By z we denote the Dirac mass in z.
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That is, if there are pure strategy equilibria such that players locate at distinct locations, then they
should be such that x = 0 and y = 1 or x = 1 and y = 0. To validate that these strategy proles
are indeed equilibria we only have to show that when one player locates at one extreme, then the other
player prefers to locate at the opposite extreme rather than to the same as her opponent. We notice that
1(0; 1) = 2(1; 0) =

2 >

2 = 1(1; 1) = 2(1; 1) and hence when the second (rst) player locates at
the right extreme, the unique best response of the rst (second) player is to locate to the left extreme.
In a similar manner one can establish that when one player locates at the left extreme the unique best
response of the other player is to locate at the right extreme.
Finally, from remark 1 we know that if there is a convergent pure strategy equilibrium it should be
such that both players locate at + . Given that the payo¤ function of the rst player is continuous in
own strategy when the second player locates at + and that
@1
@x (x;

+ ) < 0 (> 0) for any x <

+
(x < + ) it follows that we cannot have convergent pure strategy equilibria in this case. 
One can further show that a variety of asymmetric mixed equilibria exists when centrifugal incentives
dominate in both directions. To demonstrate this, we consider for simplicity that  =  = 1 and we
construct asymmetric equilibria of the game. Let R be the mixed strategy p0 +(1 p)1 where p 2 [0; 1].
Since 1(x;R) = p(x2 + (1  x)) + (1  p)(x+ 1 x2 ) for all x 2 (0; 1), we obtain that it does not depend
upon x if and only if:
p =
1
2
 1  2
1     
In such cases, since 1(0; R) = p

2 + (1   p)12 and 1(1; R) = p12 + (1   p)2 are strictly smaller
than 1(x;R) for all x 2 (0; 1), we obtain that any x 2 (0; 1) is a best response to R. In particular,
1
2 is a best response to R. Since both 0 and 1 are best responses to
1
2 , we have demonstrated that 
1
2 ; R

and
 
R; 12

are Nash equilibria. Consider also as before the o¤-diagonal prole (U;R) where U
denotes the uniform probability on [0; 1]. What is the best response of player 2 to U ? Since 2(U; y) = 
1
2     

y2 +
 
+    12

y+ 14 is convex and symmetric around
1
2 if  =  and  <
1
4 , 0 and 1 are the
best responses. Therefore, if  =  and  < 14 , (U;R) is also a Nash equilibrium. Finally, consider the
strategy prole (G;R) where G is the absolutely continuous mixed strategy identied in Proposition 4.
We argued that any x 2 (0; 1) is a best response to R and, thus, G is a best response to R: Moreover we
know that any y 2 [0; 1] is a best response to G: That is, (G;R) is also an equilibrium for (; ) 2 (0; 12)2:
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5 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed equilibrium behavior in a general spatial competition model which we believe to be
relevant especially in electoral competition. Our results indicate that an equilibrium exists in the spatial
competition model for a general class of centrifugal incentives (essentially any centrifugal incentives that
may arise due to partial voter participation). We moreover show that standard convergent equilibrium
behavior is robust to introducing low to mild centrifugal forces in one or both directions but it collapses
once centrifugal forces become strong even in only one direction. Analysis of a symmetric equilibrium for
the simplest parametrization of our model (constant functions and uniform distribution) gives us a hint
of what are most probable outcomes of such games and proves that, in this model, there are no sudden
changes in equilibrium behavior when parameter values change smoothly despite the fact that we may
have transitions from equilibria in pure strategies to ones in mixed strategies.
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6 Appendix
In this appendix we provide some discussion of pure strategy equilibria when the distribution of vot-
ers in nonuniform and some microfoundations of the constant functionsquadruple (; ; ; ) that was
extensively used throughout the paper.
6.1 Nonuniform distributions
In the case of a uniform distribution, when ^ = ^, the game admits Nash equilibria in pure strategies:
(12 ;
1
2), no di¤erentiation, when ^ >
1
2 and (0; 1), maximal di¤erentiation, when when ^ <
1
2 . The
existence of a local19 Nash equilibrium exhibiting no di¤erentiation when ^ > 12 and di¤erentiation when
^ < 12 continues to hold for a large class of distributions. Consider a distribution described by the density
f which will be assumed di¤erentiable, symmetric with respect to 12 (that is, f(x) = f(1   x) for all
x 2 0; 12) and strictly increasing on 0; 12 (and so strictly decreasing on 12 ; 1). Let (x; y) be a prole
of locations such that: x < 12  y . Without loss of generality20 assume that x+y2  12 . For the player
located on the left, moving on the right leads to a gain of 2f(
x+y
2 ) and to a loss of (1  ^)f(x). If ^  12 ,
then the gain is always larger than the cost and the equilibrium is dened by x = y = 12 . If otherwise
^ < 12 , a marginal equilibrium is obtained when the marginal rate of substitution
1
2
f(x+y
2
)
(1 ^))f(x) is equal to 1,
that is,
19We have not investigated the general conditions on f under which this LNE is a (global) Nash equilibrium.
20 If x+y
2
 1
2
, conduct the same argument from the perspective of the player on the right.
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12
f(
x+ y
2
) = (1  ^)f(x)
or
f(x) =
1
2 (1  ^)f(
x+ y
2
)
Let us test when the symmetric prole (x; 1  x) with x < 12 is a (local) Nash equilibrium.21 From
above, the rst order condition writes:
f(x) =
1
2 (1  ^)f(
1
2
)
If f(0) = 0, then the above equation has a unique solution x. We may also check that the (local)
second order condition is satised. Indeed the second derivative at x
1
4
f 0(
1
2
) + (^  1)f 0(x) = (^  1)f 0(x)
is negative as ^ < 1. For the sake of illustration, consider the (symmetric) Beta distribution22:
f(x) =
 (2)
 ()2
(x (1  x)) 1 over [0; 1]
with  > 1. In such case, x is the solution of the equation:
x(1  x) = 1
4

1
2 (1  ^)
 1
 1
We obtain:
21Since we have assumed f strictly increasing, this argument does not apply to the uniform distribution. In fact, for the
uniform distribution the marginal rate of substitution at any prole (x; y) is equal to 1
2(1 ^) .
22  denotes the Gamma function. In particular  (n) = (n  1)! for any integer n.
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x =
1
2
 
r
1 

1
2(1 ^)
 1
 1
2
As we observe di¤erentiation (dened by 1 2x (^; )) is reduced when F is more concentrated around
the center (large values of ) and when the centrifugal incentives are less intense (large values of ^). This
is illustrated on table 1 for ^ = 0 and on table 2 for ^ = 14 .
 2 10 100
x 0:14645 0:36387 0:45824
Table 1
 2 10 100
x 0:21132 0:39506 0:46803
Table 2
6.2 An application
In this section we develop a model of electoral competition among four parties, two instrumental and two
parametric ones, and we demonstrate that it is a particular case of the general model studied above. Let
fl; 1; 2; rg be the set of political parties and [0; 1] the policy space. The policy platforms of the extremist
parties, l and r, are xed exogenously and are 0 and 1 respectively.23 Parties 1 and 2 - which we call
mainstream - strategically decide their policy platforms, x and y, in order to maximize their vote-share
and votersideal policies are distributed uniformly on the interval [0; 1].
We consider a two-stage extended form game of perfect information and, naturally, the solution concept
that we apply is subgame perfection. In the rst stage, the two mainstream parties decide their policy
platforms and then the voters observe (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 and they vote. We allow both pure and mixed
strategies for any of our players. Let (1; 2) denote a pair of mixed strategies for the two mainstream
candidates (probability distributions such that their support is a subset of [0; 1]) and ^i(x; y) denote a
23Another example of an electoral competition model with non-instrumental extremist parties is Indridason (2013).
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mixed strategy of a voter with ideal policy i 2 [0; 1] (probability distribution such that its support is a
subset of fl; 1; 2; rg) when the voter observes that the policy platforms of the two mainstream parties
are given by (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2. Then a strategy prole in our game is given by  = f(1; 2); ^ such that
^(x; y) 2 ^ for all (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2g where ^(x; y) is such that ^i(x; y) 2 ^(x; y) for every i 2 [0; 1] and each
possible subgame (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2.
Each extremist/niche party is assumed to promote a cause that is independent of the main policy issue
and which votersmay nd attractive or repulsive.24 Votersvaluation of a cause promoted by a party is
captured by an attraction/repulsion parameter k 2 R for k 2 fl; 1; 2; rg: If k > 0 then the promoted
goal is attractive and if k < 0 it is repulsive (we assume that mainstream parties do not promote such
causes and hence 1 = 2 = 0).
Our voters are expressive and sophisticated at the same time; they know that they cannot individually
inuence the outcome of elections - hence they derive utility only from voting for the party that they
prefer - but they are able to take in account expectations about the voting behavior of their fellow citizens
whenever this is relevant. We consider that the payo¤ of a voter with ideal policy i 2 [0; 1] who votes
for a party k 2 fl; 1; 2; rg with policy platform  k 2 [0; 1] when we are in subgame (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 and all
other voters are expected to behave according to ^ i(x; y) = ^(x; y)  f^i(x; y)g is given by:
ui( k; k; ^
 i(x; y)) =   j k   ij+ k  vk(^ i(x; y))
where vk(^ i(x; y)) is the expected vote-share of party k 2 fl; 1; 2; rg when all other voters are expected
to vote according to ^ i(x; y).
Notice that the component of the above utility function which does not relate to the position of the
party on the main political issue is not xed25 as in Groseclose (2001) or Aragonès and Palfrey (2002)
but it also depends on the "electoral power" of each party. This is so because, if the cause that a niche
party k 2 fl; rg promotes is attractive for the voters then the impact of this niche party on government
policy outputs - and hence on the voters welfare - will be increasing in the niche partys vote-share and
vice versa.
Consider that we are in subgame (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 with x < y and that ^(x; y) is such that both
24We also have results, which are available upon request, for a case in which votersare allowed to have heterogeneous
valuations on the goal promoted by an extremist/niche party and which are in line with the present analysis.
25Glazer, Grofman and Owen (1998) also consider voters who evaluate a party di¤erently depending on who else is expected
to vote for it. In their case the externality is not anonymous while in our case it is.
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mainstream parties get a strictly positive vote-share. Then, if ^(x; y) is a Nash equilibrium of the (x; y) 2
[0; 1]2 subgame there should exist il1 2 [0; x] such that:26
uil1(0; l; ^
 il1(x; y)) = uil1(x; 1; ^
 il1(x; y))
which is equivalent to
il1 =
1
2 lx
because when F is uniform, x < y and ^(x; y) is a Nash equilibrium of the (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 subgame
such that all parties get a strictly positive vote-share, it must be the case that vl(^ il1(x; y)) = il1.
Equivalently, one can show that in a Nash equilibrium of the (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 subgame in which all
parties get positive vote-shares there should also exist i12 2 [x; y] and i2r 2 [y; 1] such that:
ui12(x; 1; ^
 i12(x; y)) = ui12(y; 2; ^
 i12(x; y))
and
ui2r(y; 2; ^
 i2r(x; y)) = ui2r(1; r; ^
 i2r(x; y))
which are equivalent to
i12 =
x+y
2
and
i2r =
1+y r
2 r
26 It is worth mentioning that in an equilibrium of an (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 subgame in which both mainstream parties get a
positive vote-share it should be the case that centrist voters (voters with ideal policies between x and y) never vote for
extremist parties. This is so because if ui(0; l; ^ i(x; y)) > uil(x; 1; ^
 i(x; y)) for some i 2 [x; y] then it should also hold
that every voter prefers party l to party 1 and hence, the vote-share of party 1 must be zero.
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It is straightforward that if the attraction parameter of the leftist niche party is su¢ ciently large
(l  1) then in any Nash equilibrium of any subgame (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2, it should be the case that no
mainstream party gets any votes and, hence, our game becomes trivial: the mainstream parties are
indi¤erent among all available strategies. This obviously holds for the attraction parameter of the rightist
niche party too. Therefore, we focus on attraction parameters which make our game non-trivial: l; r < 1.
If the attraction parameters of the niche parties are small enough, l; r < 1, then for every subgame
(x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 there exists a unique Nash equilibrium such that both mainstream parties get a positive
vote-share. The payo¤ of mainstream party 1 in this Nash equilibrium of any (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2 subgame is
given by:
1(x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
x(1 l2 l ) +
y x
2 if 0  x < y  1
1
2(x
1 l
2 l + (1  x)
1 r
2 r ) if x = y
(1  x)1 r2 r +
x y
2 if 0  y < x  1
and the payo¤ of mainstream party 2 is given by:
2(x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
y(1 l2 l ) +
x y
2 if 0  y < x  1
1
2(y
1 l
2 l + (1  y)
1 r
2 r ) if y = x
(1  y)1 r2 r +
y x
2 if 0  x < y  1
Hence, this two player game is identical to the one we extensively analyzed in the previous section for
 = 1 l2 l ,  =
1 r
2 r and  =  = 1. When both extremist parties promote repulsive causes l; r < 1
(strong centripetal incentives from both sides) we have a unique convergent equilibrium to the side of
the more repulsive extremist party, when one extremist party promotes a repulsive cause and the other
extremist party promotes an attractive cause (mixed incentives) then we have a symmetric equilibrium in
mixed strategies such that mainstream parties locate (in expected terms) to the side of the extremist party
which promote the repulsive cause and when both extremist parties promote attractive causes, there is a
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies such that the mainstream parties locate (in expected terms)
in the center of the policy space.
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a) α=3/4, β=2/3, γ=δ=1 and y=1/2 
 
b) α=3/4, β=2/3, γ=δ=1  and y=1/4 
 
c) α=1/4, β=1/4, γ=δ=1  and y=2/3 
 
d) α=1/4, β=1/4, γ=δ=1  and y=1/7 
 
e) α=3/4, β=1/3, γ=δ=1 and y=2/3 
 
f) α=3/4, β=1/3, γ=δ=1  and y=1/4 
 
Figure 1. The payoff of the first player as a function of x for various values of α, β and y. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
a) α1 and β0 
 
b) α=0.7 and β=0.3 
 
Figure 2. CDF (Blue) and PDF (Red) of G for α>0.5>β when γ=δ=1. 
 
 
 
a) α=0.05 and β=0.05 
 
b) α=0.2 and β=0.2 
 
c) α=0.25 and β=0.25 
 
 
d) α=0.3 and β=0.3 
 
Figure 3. CDF (Blue) and PDF (Red) of G for α,β<0.5 when γ=δ=1. 
 
